

CAN IPB ELIMINATE MISSION CREEP?

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
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Infantry**



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
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
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Title of Monograph: *Can Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Eliminate
Mission Creep*

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ABSTRACT

CAN INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD ELIMINATE MISSION CREEP? By MAJ Todd R. Wood, USA, 49 pages.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, U.S. political and military involvements have increased. The specific missions vary from humanitarian operations to peacekeeping which are known as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The major challenge to military leaders and planners involves adapting our units, doctrine, and equipment to the successful accomplishment of OOTW. A phenomenon in the execution of these new missions is the idea of "mission creep", which causes units to conduct operations that vary from original orders. The real challenge for commanders and staffs is how to deal with mission creep? This monograph examines the phenomena of mission creep in OOTW environments, and answers the question: in OOTW is it possible to eliminate mission creep through detailed and thorough Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)?

OOTW operations are conducted by conventional units using standard doctrine; therefore, the monograph begins by examining existing IPB doctrine. The focus narrows to specific OOTW environments. Several different OOTW techniques are introduced and discussed in relation to doctrine. They are then compared and contrasted to each other to determine the effect of the techniques on the IPB process to allow the elimination of mission creep. In order to understand the practical application of IPB in OOTW environments two historical examples are examined, the 10th Mountain Division in Haiti and in Somalia.

Finally the concept of mission creep is examined in the context of Ends-Ways-Means to determine if the root causes can be changed by the division commander. The monograph studies the phenomenon of mission creep, the possible causes of mission creep, and possible solutions in eliminating the problem. The monograph concludes by providing guidance which highlights the usefulness of IPB for eliminating mission creep in OOTW.

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Chapter I: Introduction

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, U.S. political and military involvements have increased greatly around the world. These politically directed military operations are conducted in countries with various levels of development and resources. The specific missions vary from humanitarian operations to peacekeeping, and these missions are grouped into the category of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). With no peer military competitor the U.S. military continues to focus more on OOTW threats. These new missions are being conducted by the same forces that were designed to defeat the Soviets on the plains of central Europe. Our recent history shows that we can be successful and also we can fail in the execution of these new missions.

The major challenge to military leaders and planners involves adapting our units, doctrine, and equipment to the successful accomplishment of OOTW missions. A phenomenon in the execution of these new missions is the idea of "mission creep," which causes units to conduct operations that vary greatly from original orders. This concept is not new, commanders and staffs have complained for generations about mission creep. What is new about mission creep now is that it is occurring more frequently in OOTW environments. The real challenge to commanders and staffs is what to do about mission creep, how do you recognize it, plan for it, and counteract it?

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the phenomena of mission creep in OOTW environments, and answer the question: in OOTW environments is it possible to eliminate mission creep through detailed and thorough Intelligence Preparation of the

Battlefield (IPB)? In the study of this topic the author will examine the IPB doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for IPB in OOTW environments to determine if planners in the field have a doctrinal base in which to deal with the problem. The author will examine two examples of U.S. Army units that conducted OOTW. These examples are of division sized units conducting operations in Haiti and Somalia, and they will illustrate examples of mission creep and its effect on the mission and unit. The author will then discuss the application of the doctrine to the examples in order to develop solutions and recommendation to the problem of mission creep. The author will conclude the paper with some additional thoughts on the subject.

In the research of this topic the author also will answer many subquestions about OOTW, IPB, and mission creep such as: is mission creep an event or a planning failure, is IPB designed to eliminate mission creep, is it fixable at the division level, is it only a problem in the minds of the weak, and is it really a problem at all?

Some have said that the true definition of mission creep is all the tasks a commander is told to accomplish but doesn't want to try. Mission creep has been described as everything from a distraction to showstopper. One common definition of mission creep is as follows: "new or shifting political guidance requires military operations different from what the intervening force initially planned"¹ This definition follows a common false thought pattern about mission creep, which at the tactical level is more like "change of mission." This definition which groups "change of mission" as mission creep also incorporates branches and sequels as mission creep. FM 100-5 defines branches as contingency plans and sequels as subsequent operations.² Changes of mission, branches,

and sequels are inconvenient to those units under their control; however, these are some commander's tools to react to a changing battlefield and cannot be considered mission creep. Fragmentary orders are a way to communicate change of mission and they cannot be considered mission creep. The only way to properly define mission creep is to look outside doctrine for the answer.

Definitions

Mission creep is a nondoctrinal term. It is a new term with negative connotations. It is also a term which is not usually stated above the division level. The reason corps and higher commanders do not recognize the idea is inherent in the definition for mission creep in this paper. Mission creep will be defined in this paper as an event which occurs at division level or below, and consists of changes or additions to the original mission, which the unit is not resourced or specifically trained to execute. The reason mission creep only exists below division level is the limitation of resources available at this level and below.

Assumptions

In order for this definition to assist in the analysis of this paper, several assumptions need to be introduced and clarified. The first assumption is about the major difference between OOTW and conventional operations, and that those differences contribute to mission creep. In a conventional war, the three levels of war strategic, operational, and tactical generally run vertically with strategic slightly overlapping into operational and operational slightly overlapping into tactical (Figure 1, DIME). In the OOTW environment the three levels of war all overlap and they are all intertwined. The area where the three levels meet is where mission creep is most likely to happen.³ An

example of this is when the battalion commander in a peacekeeping mission is tasked to establish markets in his sector.




Figure 1 DIME

The next assumption that is closely related to the environment is that the instruments of power which are diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) set the conditions for and contributes to mission creep. The definition of DIME for our government is the tangible resources that can be purposefully crafted, manipulated, altered, and balanced for a power.⁴ The relationship of the DIME factors in a conventional war is totally different that in OOTW. In conventional warfare most of the military activity is run and controlled by the military in DIME, except the strategic level of war. In an OOTW environment the lead instrument of power is usually not the military

and it may be a combination of several instruments. This further contributes to mission creep and sets the conditions for confusion. The combinations of three levels of war and all elements of the DIME working simultaneously create conditions that for tactical units that make accomplishing the mission difficult.

Planning

After examining the working definition of mission creep, understanding the assumptions of OOTW environment, and understanding the contribution of our systems to mission creep, it is important to examine part of our planning process. Part of mission creep is the word mission. Divisional units are tasked to accomplish missions. The division headquarters tasks their subordinate units to accomplish specific missions. The stepped planning process we have developed has a section called mission analysis, in which the commander and staff critically analyze the mission tasked to them from the higher headquarters. This step happens very early in the planning process, and is critical in determining if the mission can be accomplished with the given resources, in the given time, and to the standard determined. This is the point where mission creep can be identified and dealt with properly. The instrument for assisting the commander and staff in this step is IPB.

Summary

IPB is a continuous process of analyzing the environment and enemy in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision making while help the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield.⁵ The solution for the problem of mission creep

lies buried in the IPB process during mission analysis. The possibility exists that mission creep can be eliminated through IPB. This paper will examine the possibilities of that statement.

The next chapter will examine the various doctrinal and nondoctrinal techniques for conducting IPB in OOTW. This will allow the overlay of doctrine on the historical examples in Chapter III.

Chapter II: Mission Creep and Doctrine

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete”⁶ Sun Tzu

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to Army doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP's) about IPB. This will allow the reader to understand the unique difficulties with intelligence analysis in OOTW environments and the soldiers' ability to work within the confines of doctrine and TTP's to conduct IPB. The thesis of this paper is that the possible solution to mission creep lies within the IPB process, and this chapter provides the basis for examining tactical units tools available to deal with mission creep.

Doctrine

Field Manual 100-5 specified doctrine as “the statement of how America's Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operations other than war . . . the condensed expression of the Army's fundamental approach to fighting, influencing events

in operations other than war, and deterring actions detrimental to national interests.”⁷

Army doctrine provides soldiers with a common base of understanding on how to conduct planning and operations. Doctrine is also the jumping off point to develop TTP’s.

Soldiers are trained to rely on doctrine when encountering new or complex situations.

The doctrinal manual which describes IPB is Field Manual 34-130. This manual is designed to be used by all types of units across the spectrum of conflicts. It is meant to assist the commander and staff in understanding the battlefield and in formulating possible friendly and threat courses of action.

The purpose of IPB as stated by FM 34-130 is:

“ IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision making. Applying the IPB process helps the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield by determining the threat’s likely COA. Describing the environment, your unit is operating within and the effects of the environment on your unit.”⁸

The IPB is a four-step process which is performed each time you conduct IPB.

The four-step process is; defining the battlefield environment, describing the battlefield’s effects, evaluating the threat, and determining threat courses of action (COA). This four-step process is very generic and it can be modified to specifically fit different environments. The technique of applying IPB may vary in different situations; however, the doctrinal principles remain applicable in all situations. The doctrinal principles of IPB are;

“Evaluating the battlefield’s effects on friendly and threat operations. Determining the threat’s possible COA’s and arranging them in order of probability of adoption. Identifying assets the threat needs to make each COA successful (high value targets) HVT and where they can be expected to appear on the battlefield. Identifying the activities, or lack of, and the locations where they occur that will identify which COA the threat has adopted.”⁹

The doctrinal principles are seen in TTP's that have been developed on IPB.

The result of IPB is the contribution it makes to the staff planning process. It enables the commander and staff to understand the enemy, terrain, and situation so that friendly COA's can be developed and friendly missions assigned to lower echelon units. It is at this juncture that IPB can eliminate mission creep. Mission creep can be identified, anticipated, and eliminated, when the IPB process outlines for the commander the specifics of the environment, battlefield effects, threat evaluation, and threat COA's.

IPB is totally integrated into the Tactical Decision Making Process(TDMP) and Deliberate Decision Making Process(DDMP), and the TDMP and DDMP are driven by IPB. The TDMP steps of mission analysis, development of COAs, and the analysis of COAs are derived and determined from IPB. An example of this would be in identifying, through IPB, that the enemy historically attacks only on holy days, with three man teams, at night, with explosives, and targets major civilian areas. This information would then allow the staff to task units to patrol heavily on, holy days, in populated areas, at night, and to look for small groups with packages. This is a simplistic example of a threat model, but it illustrates the potential of the IPB process. If the process is not inclusive of all aspects of the enemy situation then the commander may fail to properly prepare for a task, which would lead to mission creep.

The IPB process produces several products which assist the command in developing the plan. Those products are population overlays, weather analysis matrix, modified combined obstacle overlays, situation development products, indications and warnings products, target development, target acquisition products, and force protection

products. (See Figure 2)¹⁰ These products are developed and updated throughout the operation and allows the commander to adjust the plan accordingly. In the example used in the preceding paragraph these products may identify the enemy uses explosives not detectable by the tactical unit's equipment. The commander would be alerted to this problem and he could request special bomb detection equipment thus eliminating mission creep.

IPB and the training involved in conducting IPB assist the planner in two ways. The first way it assists the planner is by providing checklist of activities and assist in mission development. The second and most important part of doctrinal IPB are the mental processes of thinking through the problems of terrain, weather, enemy, and the situation. IPB conditions the planner to think along certain lines. This enables the planner to anticipate events on the battlefield, which assist the commander in accomplishing the mission. The checklist is only as good as it's appropriate application.

IPB and OOTW

Up to this point the doctrine discussed has been in general terms that concern the doctrinal principles of IPB. It is important to examine the OOTW specific IPB as stated in FM 34-130. The key difference in IPB in OOTW and conventional planning is the focus of the IPB and the degree of detail required to support the commander's decision making process. The other major difference includes the impact of the political situation and the greater demand for demographic analysis.¹¹ (See Figure 2 for Differences).

FM 34-130 provides outlines for IPB in the areas of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations, Support to Counter-Drug Operations, Peacekeeping

Operations, Combating Terrorism, Shows of Force, Attacks and Raids, Peace Enforcement, Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, and Support to Civil Authorities.¹² Those sections provide the planner with valuable starting points to begin IPB in OOTW, but they are all not inclusive to all OOTW situations.

Another doctrinal manual which provides planners a tool for IPB is FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. This doctrine was designed to educate soldiers to Low Intensity Conflict. Appendix C, "How to Analyze an Insurgency or Counterinsurgency," is a list of questions which enable a planner to examine the nature of society, the nature of the insurgency, and the nature of government.¹³ This doctrine is consistently in agreement with the principle of IPB. FM 100-20 is more detailed and in depth and it specifically focuses on insurgency and counterinsurgency.

CONVENTIONAL PROCESS	OOTW PROCESS
Terrain Overlay (MCOO)	Population Status Overlay Logistics Sustainability Overlay Lines of Communication Overlay Key Facilities and Targets Overlay
Weather Overlay	Weather Overlay
Threat Overlay	Insurgent Threat overlay Criminal Threat Overlay Psyop Overlay External Support Overlay Counterdrug Threat Overlay
N/A	Host Nation Government Overlay
N/A	Host Nation Military Disposition
Doctrinal Template	Doctrinal Template Operational Patterns Overlay
Situational Template	Incident Map Key Facilities and Targets Overlay
Decision Support Template	Decision Support Template Decision Support Matrix

IPB Graphics: Conventional VS. OOTW
(FIGURE 2, ¹⁴)

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Most of the TTPs have been developed from FM 34-130 and FM 100-20. The doctrine lays a solid foundation for the development of other ways to conduct IPB. Because of the nature of OOTW a planner needs an IPB tool that is versatile in the various environments. TTPs provide the planner with operation specific tools to accomplish the IPB. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to examining TTPs, which are variations of the IPB which is targeted at specific OOTW situations.

The various TTPs is a direct offshoot of doctrine as stated in FM 34-130 and FM 100-20 and the examination of the TTPs is important. The examination of TTPs will be conducted using the criteria of focused detail and predictability. Focused detail will be defined as the ability to compile information in a way that allows the commander and staff to effectively formulate the missions of subordinate units and shape the battlefield. All TTPs concerning IPB will focus on detail, but it is critical to focus the detail to logical conclusions. Predictability will be defined as the ability to predict what the enemy will do over the time period of weeks and months. All TTPs focus on predictability in the short term, but not all focus on the long term. The goal of the TTPs is to assist the commander in the decision making process, as stated earlier, this will allow the commander to recognize mission creep and react to minimize or eliminate the concept.

There are many ways to conduct IPB in OOTW. There are many tools available to the planner which include the doctrinal models to unit SOPs. Three different TTPs have been selected for analysis and comparison because of their emphasis and approach to conducting IPB. They are the 82nd Airborne Divisions Intelligence Tactics, Techniques

and Procedures (TTP) For Operations Other Than War(OOTW) handbook, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Military Operation Other Than War(MOOTW) Analysis Model, and the Triad Analysis Process (TAP). A short description of each TTP will be discussed in the next paragraphs.

82nd Handbook:

The 82nd Handbook is soundly based on the IPB doctrine and founded in the principles of IPB. It is a combination of checklists, intelligence assets employment techniques, command and control structures, collection management, lessons learned, and planning techniques. The handbook devotes much of its effort to information gathering and analysis in a low-intensity conflict. The handbook constantly emphasizes the importance of IPB to the commander and that the focus of the information gathering must have a purpose, which is to enable analysis. The analysis is focused on developing the threat model.

The purposes of the threat models are to eliminate risk and uncertainty, identify gaps, speculate, and predictive problem solving. The threat models they propose are based on thinking in colors; white meaning battlefield environments, red meaning organizational structure of the threat, blue meaning the organizational structures of the friendly forces, green meaning population, black meaning physical objects. The purpose of this color coded system is to allow the planner to form a mental model of the area of operations and area of interest. After the model is formed, it must be tested for validity against current and historical events. After the threat model is proven usable, the handbook advocates several ways to conduct analysis that include pattern analysis, link analysis, and combined

analysis.


The conclusion of the model testing and analysis is the development of COAs. This is critical in assisting the commander in visualizing the battlefield. This model is oriented on predicting the enemy.¹⁵ Such as identifying what specific events the enemy is likely to conduct, the way they may conduct the attack, but not knowing the time or place of the attack. This model assists in determining possible locations of targets and pattern analysis of possible times of the attack. In anti-drug operations it assists in locating drug processing sites, drug labs, and the approximate times for distribution.

CGSC MOOTW Analysis Model

The next TTP to be examined is the CGSC MOOTW Analysis Model. This model is a guide to the examination of OOTW at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The purpose of the model is to focus the information gathering process on the national problem, military mission, nature of the physical environment, nature of society, nature of external forces, nature of the crises, time, logistics, and courses of action.¹⁶ Each of these areas includes a series of questions to be considered by the planner and ends with section to state deductions about the topic. The focus is on detailed information gathering and not on predicting. The purpose of the model is stated as “the MOOTW Analysis Model is not intended to be predictive of outcomes in Military Operations Other Than War.”¹⁷ However, it is designed to allow the planner to develop predictive models from the extensive information compiled. These predictive models can range from everything from color coded systems described in the 82nd Handbook, to counter insurgency models developed during the operations.

Triad Analysis Process

The final TTP that will be discussed is the Triad Analysis Process (TAP) as applied to OOTW developed by Captain Shannon D. Beebe. He recognized that a gap existed in what IPB produces and what the commander actually needs in OOTW environments. This gap, as he describes it, is a result of not accurately assessing the operational environment with the goal of predicting future events. He proposes to use TAP, which is the formula of event-action-outcome, designed to formulate theoretical studies, as a way to begin to predict what one should do in certain circumstances.¹⁸ (See Figure 3).



(Figure 3)

Event, Action, Outcome

TAP is a tool to be used in conjunction with IPB. It is based on the assumption that the enemy acts rationally from his own point of view and that stability operations occur in Third World countries. These assumptions are logical and they are consistent with planning in OOTW. The author's description follows:

“...for every event occurring between Actor A and Actor B there is a response in the form of some type of action. As a result of this action-say, by Actor B-an outcome is produced, which then gives rise to another event. This cycle is continually exercised until a solution is reached between the two parties. An *event* is defined as any perceived or real occurrence by a party that, ultimately, will

invoke a response by an opposing party that will either advance or deteriorate relations between them. In stability operations, events may be classified as either good will or adverse event. An adverse event is some occurrence that threatens or reduces stability. On one end of the spectrum, a goodwill event may be the opening of dialogue between opposing factions to exchange prisoner and free hostages. On the opposite end, adverse events may be the breaking of treaties to increase, open violence between factions. The second stage of the Triad process is *action*, the response to an event. It is here the military commander attempts to influence the situation and affect the cycle. After the event occurs the staff develops and war games COAs. At this point, the benefits of the process are most obvious.”¹⁹

The purpose of this system is to examine and understand the relationship between groups, events, relationships, and actions. This ultimately allows the commander and staff to better visualize the complicated situation at hand. Assisting the commanders in visualizing the environment is the strongest piece of this process:

“By continuously recording the event-action-outcome cycle using commonalities, trends will begin to develop in a process similar to the IPB doctrinal and situational templating. Once commanders and staffs understand the factors and trends, they may influence their operational environment. Their goals shift from trying to predict events as independent acts to determining commonalities. If the commander is able to predict outcomes based on commonalities, he can be more assured of achieving stability.”²⁰

It is understood that predictability is not a crystal ball and in this process it only allows the commander to better understand the effects in the environment.

Comparisons

The three different TTPs approaches IPB in OOTW differently. It is important to compare and contrast using focused detail and predictability as the standard. This will allow the reader to understand which method provides the planner the best opportunity to both recognize mission creep and to be equipped to fully understand the problem.

In the area of focused detail the TAP model does not give specific list or question;

however it does stress the need for detailed information and the goal is to focus the commander. The CGSC model is mainly focused on gathering a great deal of detail, but it fails to focus the planner on what to do with the details. The model correctly focuses on the key aspects of OOTW such as nature of society, armed forces, and external forces. It contains some very good question but it fails to introduce an effective analysis tool. The CGSC model has a deduction section at the end of each set of questions but the deductions are not tied together.²¹

The 82nd Handbook contains many checklists and examples to assist in the gathering of data. It also introduces a model to focus the data collection and assist the planner. It contains many examples of how the information is to be collected, synthesized, and presented in order to enable the commander to understand the problem.²² The 82nd Handbook takes the best of the doctrine and real life experience and compartmentalizes the information into understandable formats. This enables it to be a user friendly and easy to implement.

Predictability is critical in the IPB process. The planner must be able to take the detailed information and make it useful in understanding of the events in the area of operations and area of interest. In the area of predictability the CGSC model makes the claim that its purpose is not to be a predictive model.²³ This does not make it a worthless model but it does highlight its main limitation. The 82nd Handbook makes every attempt to build predictive models and it stresses the importance of testing the models. It provides a very detailed model for the analysis of the information to assist the commander.²⁴

A major issue in regard to predictability, concerns the length of time the prediction

can cover. The answer is usually near term, and it fails to look as far out as the next mission which is also a failure with IPB doctrine. The TAP Model is strictly focused on the long term predictability. It introduces the planner to examining the events on the area of interest and area of operations as a series of events which have long term connotations. TAP differs from doctrine in that it is not totally reliant on the enemy making the next move; therefore, it has the ability to see farther out. In OOTW it is not only important to see the opposing parties' next step, but each step after.²⁵

The overall assessments of the three TTPs examined actually follows a continuum of the CGSC model on one end, TAP on the other end and the 82nd Handbook in the middle. CGSC Model is focused on detail, the TAP is not, CGSC Model is not focused on predictability and the TAP model is focused on predictability. The 82nd Handbook has detailed information gathering and predictability but only as far as doctrine has allowed it to develop. All three models are founded in doctrine and all three model are applicable in most situations; however, in an OOTW information must produce models so that prediction can be made about belligerents. Without the existence of predictable models the commander is left to guess for himself what the reactions of the belligerents will be, and that could hamper the effectiveness of friendly courses of action. The following chart helps to illustrate the major differences between the models in Figure 4.

	TAP	CGSC MODEL	82 ND HANDBOOK
DETAILED INFORMATION	*Recognized the importance of focused information.	*Very detailed on nature of society, external, and crises.	*Very detailed on demographics.
PREDICTABILITY	*Long range. See enemy activities as events in the long term patterns and themes.	*Limited predictive value unless tied to other predictive models.	*Doctrinal based, provides predictive model but it is shortsighted.

(Figure 4)
Comparison

Summary

IPB in its pure doctrinal form does provide information on the immediate situation to the commander and staff. This information by itself is of limited use to the commander in visualizing the future. TTPs assist in moving to the next step of being able to build predictive accurate models to assist the commander in developing the plan. Doctrine provides the base for the TTP to be developed, once the TTP is developed then it is modified to fit a certain situation. It is possible for combinations of TTPs and doctrine could be effective in certain situations.

The best TTP would be the one that is flexible, focused, and predictive. It needs to be flexible to adapt to the quickly changing environment of OOTW. It needs to be focused on the informational gathering and analysis/synthesis, not just compiling facts and data. The most important factor is that it needs to be predictive. Predictive models are the keys to elimination of mission creep. Predictive models, while not completely reliable allow the commander to visualize events before they happen. If the command can relate action-reaction-counteraction to the current and future situation then mission planning will

be greatly enhanced. The IPB can provide him with the enemy COAs that will allow him to visualize the employment of troops and the results of actions. If the IPB is effective, the commander and staff can determine if the unit is trained and resourced properly to accomplish the mission.

The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the reader to doctrine and explain the connection of IPB to the commander's decision making process. The role of IPB is critical to the commander. The better the IPB is the more effective the commander and the unit will be in solving the tactical problem. Doctrine provides the baseline for IPB. TTPs are the working tools, the application of the IPB doctrine to real situations. The doctrine also provides the planner with a mental model of how to organize the information into usable forms. The TTPs then refine the IPB process to enable the commander to have a clearer vision of the battlefield.

There are many ways to conduct IPB and every unit has its variation of TTPs for OOTW. This paper only identified three possible variations of IBP TTPs. The challenge for the planner is to find the one that works best in the appropriate situation. If the commander has an incomplete view of the situation and his vision is unclear mission creep is most likely to occur.

The next section of this paper will discuss the historical examples of the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia and in Haiti. The doctrine and models will be overlaid to the historical situations in order to examine examples where IPB identified potential mission creep type problems and helped to eliminate them. There will also be examples where IPB failed and mission creep occurred. It is not the intention to criticize the

planners of either operation, but to use their complicated and difficult situations to illustrate the importance of IPB.

Chapter III: Historical Examples

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to some historical examples of OOTW. It is very easy to misuse history in the analysis of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Many writers use history to “validate” their particular viewpoint. The purpose of these historical examples is only to illustrate the possibilities that existed at that time to identify and eliminate mission creep using the IPB process. The obvious use of historical examples in this context is to identify problems in the operation, and trace them directly to the planning and IPB. The author has avoided that approach as much as possible, and will illustrate where the positive aspects and mission success were traced to planning and IPB.

The intent of this section is not to identify a laundry list of IPB and intelligence failures, but instead identify intelligence success which demonstrated sound use of doctrine and effective use of the kinds of TTPs discussed in the earlier chapter. This is why the two examples, the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia and in Haiti were chosen. The two examples used in this paper help to illustrate both good and bad aspects of OOTW missions with tactical intelligence operations and planning.

The idea that the U.S. Army does not learn from history and operational mistakes are not true with relation to IPB in OOTW. Organizations do have institutional memory and it is possible for organizations to learn. This learning was, proven in the response to

the problems as seen in OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. One major problem was identified as; "...IPB process failed to provide CENTCOM/JTF and ARCENT commanders sufficient detailed products during the early stages of deployment planning."²⁶ This problem led to failure to identify clans (belligerents) intent which then led to the deployment of the improper force package.²⁷ This improper force package caused mission creep as defined in the first chapter, units were asked to perform missions they were not trained or equipped to accomplish. It also caused the subordinate units to improperly task organize, determine unit boundaries, and enlist local support for operations. This problem with the IPB was largely due to problems with IPB as illustrated in OOTW doctrine. It was also affected by the compressed planning and deployment schedule under which tactical units operated. The IPB problem was largely resolved by the time units deployed to Haiti. There were still problems but not to the degree that the units experienced in Somalia.

Somalia 10th Mountain Division

U.S. military activities in Somalia represent a costly and regrettable example of poor support to United Nations during OOTW. It was in this operation that the word mission creep became a popular word with the media and public. The most dramatic result of the mission creep was demonstrated on 3-4 October 1993 when 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed and 75 wounded in fighting with factional clans, while most in the U.S. thought we were feeding the hungry.²⁸ In analyzing this operation it is easy to identify failures and to place blame; however, there were many examples of mission success. There were many firsts for the U.S. Army, and lessons learned in the Somalia

operations have been incorporated into OOTW doctrine. This section will identify examples of where mission creep was avoided as well as where mission creep occurred and connect it to the IPB process.

The problems in Somalia began with the civil war which started in 1988 and ended in 1992 with the government fleeing in exile. The victorious side was composed of a coalition of clans held together only by the hatred of the current regime. Once the regime was overthrown, the various clans began fighting each other. The civil war and clan fighting took a heavy toll on the civilian population and affected the agricultural production of the region. The lack of agricultural production along with a drought devastated the population with starvation and disease. This led the U.N. to take action in the form of resolutions, which provided humanitarian assistance with limited military operations.²⁹

The first U.N. operation was PROVIDE RELIEF from 15 August 1992 to 9 December 1992, the second operation was RESTORE HOPE from 9 December to 4 May 1993, the third operation was USFORSOM from 4 May 1993 to 31 March 1994.³⁰ This section will focus on the activities of the 10th Mountain Division during OPERATION RESTORE HOPE.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE began for the 10th Mountain Division with a notification, on 30 November 1992, from XVIII Airborne Corps, which stated they were being considered for the operation in Somalia. The division was designated as the ARFOR(Headquarters For All Army Forces) on 3 December 1992 and scheduled to begin deployment on 7 December 1992 (D-2). 9 December (D-Day), the first Marines landed in

Mogadishu, and the decision was made to land ARFOR units on D+3, seven days ahead of schedule. At D+10 the main ARFOR forces were on the ground and operational.³¹ The division was executing an almost no-notice alert and deployment. They never had time to adequately plan, rehearse, or train for the operation. The lack of time would adversely affect the mission planning and force packaging.

The U.S. operation was a four-phased plan. Phase I, Secure Lodgement and Establish ARFOR occurred from D-Day to D+7, Phase II, Expand Security Operation Out to Relief Distribution Sites, Phase III, Expand Security Operation, and Phase IV, Transition to United Nations.³² The initial mission for the division was:

“...secure the airfield at Baledogle and other key installations to provide security for operations is support to relief distribution sites in order to provide security for humanitarian agencies to conduct operation . . . As the operation continued, additional tasks were assumed. We assisted in standing up councils and government, rebuilt schools and orphanages, conducted disarmament of warring factions, taught English in schools, repaired and built roads, and assistance in many other ways.”³³

Mission analysis is difficult without a clear mission, commander's intent, and end state. With changing missions that cover such a broad context, it becomes almost impossible to conduct effective IPB whether using doctrine or TTPs.

The 10th Mountain Division did experience mission creep as defined earlier, and due to the changing situation and missions on the ground in Somalia. The mission creep they experienced directly correlates with the IPB and mission planning prior to deployment. The insufficient IPB was due to two factors, the lack of strategic IPB, which provides basic planning information, and a compressed planning sequence. The unit was

originally allotted 10 days to plan for the mission but that time was reduced to 4 days.

The compressed time planning sequence compounded the IPB problems.

The problems with IPB began with the description of the battlefield. The AO (area of operation) and AI (area of interest) were not properly addressed. No historical data was available on the patterns of the warring faction, and their equipment was not known. This caused the commander to have an unclear picture of the enemy situation. The effect was to plan for the worst case scenario, clan resistance. This did not initially occur. The result was the unnecessary deployment and redeployment of 18% of the equipment.³⁴ Detailed maps and topography were not available to the division planners and caused problems in planning that resulted in the commander and the staff not understanding the environment of the operation.

The IPB failed to identify 49 humanitarian relief and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already operating in the country.³⁵ This resulted in confusion as to what the NGOs capabilities were and where they had been operating. The lack of information about the warring clans, terrain, and NGOs combined to give the deploying commander a fuzzy picture of the AO. This in turn affected both the selection of forces deployed, and the order in which they arrived. Additionally arriving units were not trained or equipped to accomplish the missions required. Thus, mission creep occurred.

The minimal planning conducted often had little relevance once the units arrived in country. Many units had their initial mission change at plane side or soon after arriving on Somalia soil.³⁶ The result was commanders and staffs exercising incredible imagination and flexibility in executing their mission. Once on the ground the units began hasty

planning and the use of continuous IPB aided to prevent further mission creep. It was quickly realized that the situation called for extensive human intelligence gathering to begin building threat templates and models. The staffs conducted extensive information gathering and debriefing of units already present, humanitarian relief workers, truck drivers, and local inhabitants. This allowed the planners to develop analytical models of the clans and factions. The results were positive and the intelligence gathering network aided the commander in determining the location of weapons storage sites, clan assembly areas, mine fields, NGOs, and the status of the villages which were in the most need of assistance. Time compounded the problems. The threat integration happened before situational or doctrinal templates were developed.³⁷ The units reacted well through more detailed intelligence gathering and flexible responses to the situations.

Through leadership, professionalism, and flexibility the 10th Mountain Division accomplished an incredible feat of restoring peace and order, during OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. The problems they encountered in planning and deployment, in operations in Somalia were overcome in most cases through determination of the soldiers and leaders. Most of their problems can be directly traced to the IPB and mission planning process. The lessons learned on this operation laid the groundwork for future U.S. OOTW missions.

One can clearly see the importance of IPB on this operation. All deployment and tactical planning are determined by the IPB process. If not done properly the results are difficult to fix during the operation. The purpose of IPB is to allow the commander to be able to visualize the battlefield. Somalia is an example of what can happen to a unit if the

commander is not provided the information to form that vision. There is also a link between strategic IPB and tactical IPB. The deploying units while planning in a compressed time sequence need all the information available. This lesson was learned when units deployed to Haiti and Bosnia, and strategic IPB was pushed to the deploying unit.

Haiti: 10th Mountain Division

The 10th Mountain Division was the building block of the 20 nations, Multinational Force Haiti/Joint Task Force 190, in Haiti during OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY from September 1994 to January 1995.³⁸ The mission was developed in response to the NCA decision to send troops to Haiti with the purpose being;

“...to ensure the Haitian armed forces and police complied with the Carter-Cedras accords, protection of U.S. citizens and interests, designated Haitians, and third country nationals, restoring civil order, assisting in the reorganization of the Haitian armed forces and police, and assisting the transition to democratic government with the successful return of President Jean Bertrand Aristide.”³⁹

Two different operation plans were developed for the contingency operation in Haiti. One plan, OPLAN 2370 was a forced entry into a non-permissive environment, the other plan OPLAN 2380, was permissive entry option.⁴⁰ The plans were different in the mission and task organization. Due to last-minute peace negotiations the forced entry option was not executed and OPLAN 2380, the permissive entry option was executed. The 10th

Mountain Division was:

“When directed, combined JTF Haiti, conducts combined military operations in Haiti under control of USACOM to protect and, if required, evacuate U.S. citizens, designated Haitians, and third country nationals; to establish and maintain a stable and secure environment; to facilitate the return and proper functioning of the Government of Haiti; to provide logistical support to coalition forces; to professionalize the military component of Haitian public security forces; and on

order, to turn over the responsibilities for ongoing operations to the Government of Haiti or designated international organizations."⁴¹

In the division commander's intent statement, he emphasizes fourteen key steps in the operation. There was a need for flexibility because plans and priorities could change, and units would need to be prepared for the changes.⁴² That flexibility was determined by the predeployment training, derived from the initial IPB. The planning and mission analysis were conducted in detail for operations. It is important to examine the impact of the planning on the operation.

The presence of mission creep manifests itself once units are on the ground. The means to influence mission creep occurs at two different times, planning and execution. The planning phase enables the commander to understand what the enemy will be like so that training and task organization can be tailored. The other way mission creep can be managed is during the operation, by predicting the critical events and outcomes of the operation. The three areas in which the IPB had the most noticeable influence on the operation are the predeployment training, the task organization, and military intelligence operations while in Haiti.

The effects of the IPB process were demonstrated first by the mission oriented predeployment training of the combat units. After the initial analysis of the mission, environment, and possible hostile forces was completed, the division began situational training exercises (STXs). These exercises focused on the usual infantry tasks such as air assault operations, live fire exercises, raids, and defense of fixed sites. Other tasks that the units trained on which can be directly traced to the IPB process were quick reaction forces

training, static security point training, hasty road block training, refuge flow control, handling of detainees, and convoy security.⁴³ Security of forces and maintaining peace was viewed as a major task to be performed during the operation. The IPB determined that the armed faction and large weapons cache sites presented a threat to security and peace operations. It was determined early that weapons buy back programs and raids on weapons cache sites was the best way to enforce security and keep the peace.⁴⁴ This training proved critical once the units arrived and began the actual disarming of the Haitians.

Weapons handling training was determined to be a critical training task. After it was determined that weapon raids and buy back programs were to be instituted the troops needed to know the different types of weapons and how to handle them.⁴⁵ Extensive predeployment training was conducted to overcome this problem.

The unit conducted extensive training at all levels in cordon and search, handling of displaced civilians, and civilian military operations.⁴⁶ The early IPB determined that these operations would be executed and the units were prepared to execute those tasks. Crowd control training proved useful to ground units. It turned out to be a common mission assigned to the units.

In the definition used for mission creep, the addition of missions the units are not trained or resourced to execute, the type of training conducted in the predeployment phase demonstrates the effectiveness of IPB on the operation. The identification of the importance of the indigent small arms weapons, crowd control, displaced civilians, and operations in urban environments, aided the units in being prepared for their unusual

mission. If the unit had not conducted effective IPB and trained for the various missions, mission creep would have existed in every operation. Early IPB allowed the commanders to visualize the operation and environment and adjust the training to focus on future missions. This can be contrasted with the units performance in Somalia in which they were not prepared to deal with the complex situations presented by displaced civilians, unruly crowds, heavily armed population, and NGOs. In Somalia most missions the units were tasked to execute demonstrated mission creep as defined in this paper. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE demonstrated that units were better prepared to execute OOTW missions, because of effective IPB leading to focused predeployment training.

The second part of the definition of mission creep involves units being resourced to conduct the operation. The determination of resources must be made prior to the deployment phase. If the unit determines it needs special equipment or special personnel once in country, it is too late. They are forced to make due with whatever units and equipment were deployed. Forcing units to attempt missions they are not equipped to accomplish is mission creep. The IPB conducted prior to deployment determines that the commander has the right force mix to accomplish all stated and implied missions. IPB was critical in determining what units were deployed to Haiti.

The initial IPB determined the need for augmentation of many divisional units and the need for special equipment. Augmentation occurred with most divisional units and included adding an MP brigade, additional MI assets, a PSYOP Group, a CA unit, and additional DISCOM support. The IPB determined that the missions once on the ground would be MP intensive and involve traffic control, security, crowd control of civil

disturbance, and crime control; therefore, the MPs were tasked as the main effort.⁴⁷

Extra dog teams were deployed to assist the infantry and to sniff out bombs. The command determined there would be a need for information dissemination to the local populace, and PSYOP teams were brought in with loud speakers and linguists to aid in information dissemination.⁴⁸ Additional MI support was identified as a problem and the MI assets at division headquarters and the MI battalion were beefed up to support the intelligence needs. These actions all occurred during the predeployment phase and affected the task organization.

The other area where mission creep was avoided was during the actual operation. IPB is a continuous process and during the actual missions it aided in reducing mission creep. The JTF-190 J2 developed some new TTPs for determining threat courses of action and non-doctrinal Risk Assessment Overlays.⁴⁹ This allowed the commanders at all levels to visualize the area of operation and understand the battlefield effects. The results were most dramatic during the weapons' cache raids and weapons turn in phase.

"Between 1 and 18 October, MNF Haiti conducted 38 raids on suspected weapons' cache sites; 23 sites had concrete results seizing weapons, wanted individual, drugs, and counterfeit money. The operations successfully capture eight of ten individuals on the MNF's "most wanted" list of dangerous persons. Mountain strikes were limited after the return of President Aristide and restoration of the legitimate government of Haiti. By that time, the principal political enemy of President Aristide, the FRAPH, was thoroughly disrupted."⁵⁰

The IPB and TTPs introduced into the operation allowed the commanders to effectively match units' abilities with missions. It allowed the units to conduct effective operations against hostile forces. If the IPB had not been effective, the results would have been some mismatches between units training and resources, and the mission.

OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY as executed by the 10th Mountain Division is considered a successful OOTW operation. The unit had learned many key lessons from Somalia and applied them to Haiti. One of the major lessons learned was the importance of the IPB process conducted at home station and continuing while in the actual theater of operations. The success of the operation began with the predeployment training and the task organization of the division. It is clear how IPB had a direct impact on the decision makers during that critical phase. The IPB continued to influence the operations while in Haiti and aided the commanders in conducting various operations. The 10th Mountain Division demonstrated before and during the operation what the effects of IPB can have on the success of the mission. Mission creep was avoided during most of the deployment.

Summary

These two historical examples are in sharp contrast to each other. The key differences which allowed the operations in Haiti more success were availability of time, information, and historical perspective. The division was able to take the information available and develop a plan which allowed the units to train and the commander to better understand the operational environment. There was still uncertainty in Haiti, and IPB did not provide the automatic fix for every problem, but it did prevent the level of mission creep experienced in Somalia. These operations demonstrate the confusing and unstable environments of OOTW. Leaders and soldiers have a difficult task in executing these missions.

The next chapter will focus on answering the questions from the Chapter I. Is the

problem mission creep or planning failure? Is IPB designed to eliminate mission creep? Is this problem fixable at division level? Is mission creep really a problem or just a failure of commanders and staffs to adapt to the situations?

Chapter IV: Discussion, Solution, and Recommendations

In order to examine the relation of mission creep, IPB, and the application to real missions, the relationships need a theoretical framework. The frame work used for this analysis will be Ends, Ways, Mean, and Risk as defined by Dr. Schneider in The Theory of Operational Art. This frame work will allow us to identify the problem of mission creep, understand the role of doctrine in solving the problem, and answer the question from Chapter I about mission creep.

End will be used interchangeably with end state. It is described as:

“The selection of the end implies the clear and complete visualization of an end-state toward which all military action is directed. The attainment of this end state assumes the creation and maintenance of a situation favorable to the forces under command. The military action must therefore be effective. This is accomplished through the selection of correct physical objective; the execution of military operations from positions of relative advantage; the correct apportionment of combat power; and maintenance of freedom of action.”⁵¹

IPB effects every aspect of ends, and the end state focuses the IPB process to assist the commander. It allows the commander to understand the terrain, environment, enemy, and other important factors which help to determine the end state. In Haiti the end state, while not crystal clear, allowed the planners to plan effective missions. In Somalia the end state was not clear, the planners had limited the focus and the plan was fragmented. In most

cases the end state is dictated to the commander and IPB allows him to determine if attainment of the end state is feasible with the assets he has at hand.

The assets used to achieve the end state are the means. "They include logistics capability, personnel, space, time, and such intangible factors as morale. The means are the total combat powers available to the commander."⁵² IPB is the tool to allow the commander to determine the means necessary to accomplish the end state. The commander is dependent on the information generated by the IPB process.

Somalia is an example of the mismatch between IPB and determining the means. The need for inter-theater human intelligence collect prior to deployment, the redeployment of 18% of the equipment, the lack of logistics, and armored vehicles are only a few examples of means mismatched to accomplish the ends. In Haiti the IPB allowed the development of two plans with different task organizations. The commander had the means available to accomplish the mission. The result was a match between the means and the end state.

The way is simply the method used to apply the means at hand.⁵³ The way the means were employed in both operations was similar and they were influenced by the IPB process. Traditional and OOTW specific tasks were accomplished in both operations. In Haiti the intelligence determined whether a permissive or nonpermissive entry would be needed. In Somalia the IPB process failed in determining the way units should initially deploy into the country.

Risk is as important part of the End-Ways-Means concept. Risk is a measure of the friction which occurs when the ways and means cannot adequately accomplish the end

state.⁵⁴ The amount of risk in an operation is also the amount of uncertainty about the environment and situation. More information does not always eliminate the risk or uncertainty, but it gives the commander awareness of the issue. The commander has several options for minimizing the risk. He can certainly influence the means and ways.

Understanding the concept of End-Ways-Means is important in order to examine the relationship of IPB in planning and executing mission in OOTW. The Ends-Ways-Means concept will now be used to analyze the question posed in Chapter I to determine what can be done about mission creep. A review of the author's definition of mission creep is needed to focus the discussion. Mission creep is an event which occurs at division level or below and consists of changes or additions to the original mission, which the unit is not resourced or specifically trained to execute.

Mission Creep or Planning Failure?

Paragraph II of the operations order is a statement of the end state. The mission statement drives the planning process. The ways, (which are troops, time, and equipment), are matched with means, (which are method and tactics) to accomplish the end state. If the plan does not call for the right means, conforming to proper methods, with the goal as the end state, then mission creep will occur because of poor planning. If the ways and means are sufficient to accomplish the end state and mission creep occurs it is usually due to other events. The most common event demonstrated in Somalia, was that the end state was not clear or constantly changing.

When the end state changes during the operation and the commander does not have the ways or means to accomplish the mission, mission creep becomes the standard.

This is the most common manifestation of mission creep but it is possible to minimize the effects. IPB is the commanders tool for enabling him to recognize situations where mission creep may exist. This was demonstrated many times in Haiti by the employment of several combat support elements to directly assist the infantry in crowd control, bomb detection, and security operations. If IPB is accomplished in enough detail, the commander should be able to anticipate most events in the AO (Area of Operations).

Not all events can be anticipated and IPB cannot predict all events. Units will never have the luxury of time to plan and train for every contingency, but good planning will alleviate the major potential mission creep areas. The commander in Haiti recognized early on that mission and priorities would change and he alerted his commanders to expect the problem.⁵⁵

The answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is that poor planning sets the conditions for mission creep to occur. Good planning and IPB can eliminate many forms of mission creep; however, end states will change. It is possible to anticipate the effects of these changes through IPB.

Can IPB Fix Mission Creep?

IPB is a process accomplished by all staff sections to support the decision making process of the commander. It focuses on gathering information and presenting the information in a format which allows the commander to see the operational environment, the enemy, and the effects of our actions on the situation. Intelligence drives the planning process for all operations.

IPB is the commander's tool to effectively match the ways to the means in order to

accomplish the ends. During the planning process and the operation IPB is continuous. The process is constantly informing the commander to changing situations in the operational environment. IPB and related TTPs build predictive models in order to see farther than the next operation. This process ideally looks far enough into future events to enable the commander to identify possible changes in end states. If the commander is able to anticipate changes to the end state mission creep can be avoided.

The answer to the question at the beginning of this section is yes, and IPB is designed to eliminate mission creep. This is dependent on the commander and his ability to use IPB to anticipate potential changes to the end state. IPB is about gathering, synthesizing, and analyzing critical information. Mission creep occurs when critical information is missing or not analyzed; therefore, IPB can eliminate most mission creep.

Is Mission Creep Fixable at Division Level?

When a division receives a mission, the staff begins the planning process. The planning process begins with mission analysis or end state analysis. The result of this analysis is to determine the ways and means to accomplish the ends. As the plan is, formulated mission essential tasks are identified and tasked to subordinate units. If the tasks assigned to the subordinate commander are beyond their capabilities, they must receive augmentation of additional assets or they may require additional training.

In the Haiti operation as the commanders and staffs conducted analysis they realized additional assets and training would be required. They requested and received those assets. Prior to deployment units were given additional training and additional units were assigned to enable them to accomplish the tasks. This kept mission creep to a

minimum. In Somalia the situation was quite different, units deployed with minimal training and inadequate resources. Once in Somalia they realized their shortfalls and all they could do was react, and mission creep was the result.

The first problem is recognizing mission creep. If the IPB is done properly and the commander recognizes that he does not have the means or ways to accomplish the end he must have some recourse. The commander could refuse the mission. This is not likely. The commander can ask that the mission tasking be changed to something the unit can readily achieve, also unlikely. The commander can ask for additional assets and training to accomplish the mission. The key to requesting additional assets and training is dependent on the ability to recognize that a potential problem exists. Mission creep can be fixed at the division level both from internal tasking and external tasking. It can be fixed by first identifying the problem very early, through IPB and mission analysis, and taking action to get additional training or assets to accomplish the mission.

Problem or Failure to Adapt?

The U.S. Army has trained for years in preparation for conventional war on the plains of Europe. The training centers build operational scenarios to replicate this type of warfare. Generations of soldiers have been trained to think in terms of conventional fighting with uniformed enemy executing identifiable doctrine and tactics. The institutional belief has been that if you can fight the big wars well, you can execute the OOTW just as effectively. There are also those that believe that all tactics and procedures can be applied to OOTW situations. This is not always true. OOTW is not a new concept to the U.S. Army. The history of the institution is filled with examples of Army units

conducting humanitarian assistance, peace keeping, and nation building.

The doctrine and training have just recently begun to address OOTW. The IPB doctrine has evolved as units are employed more often in OOTW environments. Commanders understand the need for training in OOTW in preparation for future operations. The training that all units receive now before going into Bosnia, is in response to the training problems encountered in both Haiti and Somalia.

Mission creep is not caused by units unfamiliar with OOTW missions or their ability to adapt to the new situations; however, units untrained and unfamiliar with OOTW are more likely to be the victims of mission creep. This is especially true of IPB in OOTW. There are special considerations and special aspects of the environment that have no parallel in conventional operations. NGOs in third world countries are one aspect that IPB needs to address along with more emphasis on demographics, ethnic, and political situations in the country. The Army is becoming more aware of the need for OOTW and training and this will increase units' ability to adapt to the unique characteristic of OOTW.

Summary

Poor planning can set the conditions for mission creep to exit. IPB can eliminate some mission creep, but when end states change during the operation units not prepared for the changes may experience mission creep. As long as the ways and means support the accomplishment of the end state mission creep will be minimized. IPB can eliminate mission creep by gathering information, synthesizing the information, and analyzing the information to enable the commander to anticipate events on the battlefield. This concept is not unique to OOTW. IPB has the same function in conventional operation, OOTW

IPB is different and the TTPs must be tailored to OOTW environments. Mission creep can be fixed at division level and IPB is the commander's tool for eliminating the problem. If the IPB is accurate enough to anticipate end state changes external mission creep can be avoided. IPB can eliminate internal mission creep by identifying possible tasks that require special training and equipment to accomplish. Mission creep is not a failure of units to adapt to new operations, but units not prepared to conduct OOTW. These units are limited in experience when it comes to the planning and execution phase of OOTW.

Chapter V: Conclusion

Mission creep is not a new concept and commanders have had to deal with it concept since our Army was formed. It goes beyond units being told to attack instead of defend. We train to be flexible on tasks that we are familiar with executing. Mission creep as described in this paper, is receiving change of mission from attacking the enemy to establishing a school, supervising elections, disarming criminal, or establishing a marketplace. This is mission creep, but it can be overcome.

In the army when faced with uncertain situations or unfamiliar operations, planners are taught to look to doctrine for a starting point. The Field Manuals provide a baseline and set of principles of conducting IPB in OOTW. These Field Manuals are then augmented to assist in specific areas in the form of TTPs. These TTPs allow the planner to refine the intelligence and information gathering into presentable form to assist the commander in planning and executing operations. The IPB process must also predict events and outcomes to enable the commander to anticipate events in the AO.

The OOTW IPB doctrine improves with each operation the Army conducts. This

was demonstrated in the performance of the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia and Haiti. While mission creep was common in Somalia, it was rare in Haiti. The majority of mission creep type problems were overcome through IPB and the connection of strategic, operation, and tactical IPB to the planning process.

Mission creep will occur when there is a disconnect between End-Ways-Means. The ends must be supported by the means available using effective methods. IPB aids the commander in ensuring that the means and ways support the ends. IPB has incredible potential to the commander that uses it to visualize the battlefield environment in terms of time and future events. It allows him to anticipate events, and plan ahead.

OOTW operations are complex, dynamic, complicated, and demanding. The operations are difficult for military planners and commanders. Intelligence and information are in high demand due to the rapidly changing environment, complex social structures, and political issues of the countries in which OOTW occurs. Intelligence has always directed the operational and tactical planning. Intelligence through the IPB process is the tool the commander has to visualize the battlefield.

IPB is not the answer to every operational problem encountered in OOTW, but it can assist in making confusing, complex situations understandable. Mission creep of some form will occur in all future operations, people are too unpredictable and our enemies do not react as we want them to react. Every contingency cannot be planned for and no amount of information will eliminate all uncertainty. Friction will always occur during operations and Murphy's Law applies to all situations. IPB is the best defense to mission creep and if used properly it can eliminate soldiers being asked to accomplish missions they were not trained or equipped to accomplish.

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